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This paper provides a summary of the main features of U.S. ﬁ  nancial and bank-
ing data during the period of the National Banking System (1863–1914). The 
purpose of the paper is to provide an overview of the stylized facts associated 
with the era, with an emphasis on those impinging on national bank behavior. 
The paper takes a detailed look at key elements of national bank balance sheets 
over time, over the seasons, and during panic periods. The interesting and puz-
zling patterns of interest rate movements during the era also are examined. The 
paper introduces a new set of disaggregated data on the national bank era that 
has not been examined by prior research. As data are presented in the paper, 
some of the key puzzles associated with the era are introduced.
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This paper takes a preliminary look at important aspects of the data associated with
the period of the National Banking System (1863–1914). The focus is an examination
of banking and interest rate data from the period. The goal is to provide an overview
of the behavior of the data over time, during panic periods, and over the seasons. More
speciﬁcally, this paper begins with an examination of the patterns observed in the
formation of national banks and in their dissolution through voluntary closings and
insolvency. I then turn to a discussion of the behavior of various bank balance sheet
items such as note issue, deposits, reserves, bankers’ balances, and loans. Finally,
the paper looks at the puzzling and interesting pattern of interest rates during the
national banking era.
The paper serves also an introduction to some of the interesting questions that
emerge when the data are examined. Other papers in this series on the National
Banking System investigate certain features of the data in much greater detail and
attempt to provide explanations for the observed patterns in the data.
2 Number of National Banks
The early years of the National Banking System witnessed rapid growth in newly-
chartered national banks. Figure 1 displays the number of national banks in operation
at the end of each year during the National Banking System era. The number of
national bank charters during the ﬁrst few years of the system was remarkable. By
the end of 1865, nearly 1,600 national banks had been chartered with total assets of
nearly $1.5 billion.










1910 1900 1890 1880 1870 1860
Source: Annual Report of Comptroller of the Currency (various years).
2.1 Conversion of state bank charters
A primary purpose of the National Banking Acts was to provide a uniform currency.
The prior period in U.S. banking history—the state banking era (1836–1863)—was
one in which state-chartered banks issued a large number of heterogeneous notes of
varying quality and value. These notes often traded at discounts at locations outside
the point of issue. It was hoped that the National Banking System would lead to
the elimination of this confusing plethora of state bank notes and to the conversion
of state banks to national bank charters. In terms of the establishment of a uniform
currency, the National Banking Acts was a success, with the help of the passage of a
ten percent tax on state bank notes in 1865. The law required that all national banks
accept the notes of other banks at par, so the discounting of notes was eliminated
3during the national banking era. Beginning in 1874, an eﬃcient means of at-par note
redemption facilitated this process.
There were straightforward rules and requirements for obtaining a national bank
charter.1 Initially, there was an expectation that most state banks would seek such
charters. But the national banking era never led to the disappearance of state banks.
In fact, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, state banks ﬂourished.
At the outset, it appeared that state banks would choose national bank status.
In fact, many of the early national banks were conversions of state banks. Of the 902
state banks that converted to national banks over the entire period, 851 did so by
the end of 1865.2 Many attribute the large number of state bank conversions in 1865
to the ten percent tax on state bank notes passed in that year. Although the tax
did not actually go into eﬀect until 1866, many state banks may have converted to
national bank charters prior to that year in anticipation of the tax. In 1865 alone, over
1,000 national banks were organized, the largest number of newly-chartered banks in
any year during the period, and 617 of these were previously state-chartered banks.
Table 1 details the number of state banks that obtained national bank charters in
1863 through 1866 and later.
After 1865, the conversion of state banks to national bank status slowed markedly.
As noted by Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 19), “By 1867, the decline in the
deposits of state and private banks had ceased. These banks then expanded so rapidly
that by 1871 the deposits of non national commercial banks equaled national bank
deposits.”
1The requirements for a national bank charter included meeting minimum capital requirements
and minimum holdings of eligible U.S. government securities.
2I thank Warren Weber for information on the dates existing state banks adopted national bank
charters.
4Table 1: Number of State Banks Acquiring National Bank Charters by
Years






Source: Data gathered by Warren Weber.
2.2 National bank formation
From Figure 1, we can identify ﬁve distinguishable periods of national bank formation.
The ﬁrst is the initial period after the establishment of the National Banking System
in which there was rapid formation of national banks. Beginning in 1866, national
bank formation slowed markedly through 1879. This was followed by a period of
moderate expansion during the 1880s and early 1890s. The last part of the 1890s was
another period of slow growth. Combined with closings of national banks, the end-of-
year number of national banks actually fell from 1894 through 1898. Changes in the
laws in 1900 made national bank operations more proﬁtable, and charters expanded
rapidly again through the end of the National Banking System period in 1914.
Table 2 details the average number of national banks chartered, broken down by
these ﬁve periods. It is interesting to note that, although contemporary and modern
scholars (for example, Cagan 1963, 1965) have discussed the decline in proﬁtability of
national bank operations during the 1880s, national banks continued to be chartered
at a fair rate.
5Table 2: National Banks Organized
Average Number






Source: Annual Report of Comptroller of the Currency (various years).
2.3 Closings of national banks
The National Banking System was successful by many measures. Although the period
witnessed recurrent widespread banking panics, the number of national bank closings
during panic periods was not spectacular and losses to depositors and noteholders
was minimal.3
Figure 2 details closings of national banks by year, broken down by whether they
were voluntary liquidations or involuntary closings due to insolvency. With the excep-
tion of 1893, the major panic years of 1873, 1884, 1893, and 1907 are diﬃcult to pick
out by examining the number of bank closings due to insolvency (bank failures). The
national bank closing rate over the entire period averaged 1.6% per year (1.3% due to
voluntary closings and 0.3% due to insolvency). To put these numbers in perspective,
national bank failure rates during the national banking era exceeded those observed
for FDIC-insured institutions from 1941 to 1981 (which averaged 0.03%), but are far
less than those observed among FDIC-insured institutions from 1982 to 1993 (0.9%).
In contrast, the failure rate for savings and loan institutions peaked at over 10% in
3See Williamson (1989b, 1989a).
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1989.
Table 3 compares the closing rates of national banks during panic years to those
associated with non-panic years. Only during the panic year of 1893 was the closing
Table 3: National Bank Closing Rates During Panics
Voluntary
Year Closings (%) Insolvent (%) Total (%)
1873 1.1 0.6 1.6
1884 1.1 0.4 1.5
1893 1.2 1.7 2.9
1907 1.3 0.1 1.4
Non-panic Years 1.3 0.3 1.6
Source: Annual Report of Comptroller of the Currency (various years).
7rate due to insolvency in excess of the average for non-panic years. Of particular
interest is 1907, often noted as the most debilitating panic of the entire period of the
National Banking System. The insolvency rate during 1907 actually was less than
the typical rate during the era. Clearly, panics did not take a major toll in terms of
failures of national banks. However, the fact that national banks had failure rates in
excess of those observed during modern, normal times, points to some potential ﬂaws
in the banking laws of the period.
3 National Bank Holdings of Eligible Securities
National bank notes were fully collateralized by holdings of eligible U.S. government
securities. In the event a national bank refused to redeem its notes or if a bank
failed, the Treasury was authorized to sell the bonds held as backing and pay oﬀ
noteholders. Prior to March 14, 1900, national banks could issue notes up to 90% of
the par or market value, whichever was lower, of eligible bonds deposited with the
U.S. Treasury. After that date, the percentage became 100%. During this period,
eligible bonds almost always sold above par so that the par valuation constraint was
typically binding.
I refer to the limits on national bank note issue implied by the requirement that
notes be backed by eligible government securities as the “collateral constraint.” After
1875, the collateral constraint was the most important constraint determining maxi-
mum national bank note circulation.4 An individual bank could only issue notes up
to 90% (100% after March 1900) of its amount of paid-in capital, but since this was
a choice variable, this regulation did not eﬀectively limit a bank’s note issue in the
long run.5 Furthermore, since most banks issued notes up to only a fraction of their
4Prior to 1875, national bank note circulation was limited in the aggregate by law. See Section 4.1
for more detail.
5There were also limits on the total number of notes a single bank could issue. However, these
8paid-in capital, this regulation did not impose a constraint at any point in time. After
1905, aggregate bank capital exceeded total eligible collateral and so did not limit
note issue.
In eﬀect, neither did the collateral constraint. Figure 3 shows aggregate national
bank holdings of eligible bonds as backing for notes.
Figure 3: National Bank Holdings of U.S. Government Bonds as Backing
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Source: Call reports from the Annual Report of Comptroller of the Currency (various years).
The bond data, as with much of the data of this paper, come from call reports
compiled by the Comptroller of the Currency. With support from the Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis, Warren Weber and I have constructed a large database derived
from the Comptroller’s call reports.6 The database consists of balance sheet items ag-
limits were only relevant to a few very large banks.
6The data are available at hhttp://minneapolisfed.org/research/economists/wewproj.
htmli.
9gregated by state and city for the period 1880 to 1910 (through 1914 for the aggregate
data). For the purposes of this analysis here, I primarily make use of the aggregate
data. I look at diﬀerences between city and country banks in a later chapter. There
were ﬁve call reports per year. Each came from a particular period of the year, but
the exact dates were (more or less) randomly picked by the Comptroller. The irregu-
lar spacing of the observations required the development of estimation techniques to
extract seasonal information from the data. These techniques will be discussed in an
appendix to the main manuscript.
Bank holdings of government securities roughly follow the pattern of national
bank note issuance that we examine in Section 4. In order to gauge the willingness
of national banks to issue notes, it is more useful to view national bank bondholdings
in the context of the total eligible bonds available as backing for circulation. This
is done in Figure 4. If banks had fully utilized their note issuing privileges, the
percentage of eligible bonds held as backing would have approached 100%.7 However,
prior to 1900, national banks only held 20–30% of the eligible bonds as backing for
national bank notes. After 1900, when changes in the laws made bank note issuance
more proﬁtable, the percentage of eligible bonds held as backing increased fairly
signiﬁcantly. Nonetheless, at the end of the National Banking System era, banks still
only held a little over 80% of the eligible bonds.
The fact that national banks did not fully intermediate the eligible U.S. govern-
ment securities into national bank notes is one element of what has been termed “the
national bank note puzzle.” In Chapter 5 of the monograph, I thoroughly examine
7Some ﬁnancial intermediaries other than national banks were legally required to hold U.S. gov-
ernment securities. Also, national banks were required to hold U.S. government bonds as collateral
for U.S. government deposits. For these reasons, it is unreasonable to believe that national banks
would have held all the securities eligible for backing. In another paper, during the discussion of
the low issuance of national bank notes, we will more appropriately adjust the amount of bonds
available for backing.
10Figure 4: Percentage of U.S. Government Bonds Held as Backing for Na-
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Source: Commercial and Financial Chronicle (various years).
all the pieces of that puzzle and analyze possible resolutions of the puzzle.
4 National Bank Note Circulation
The key feature of the National Banking Act is that it determined the rules by which
national banks could issue private bank notes backed by government bonds. In the
early part of the national banking era, national bank notes constituted 40–45% of
currency in circulation. However, this percentage trended downward throughout the
national banking era. By the end of the era, national bank notes were only 10–15%
of hand-to-hand currency.8 The U.S. Treasury issued all other forms of currency in
8A small amount of private currency issued by farmers, merchants, railroads, and mills was, for
the most part, tolerated during the period. These forms of private money were typically of small
denomination and only circulated in a region near the point of issue.
11circulation. Treasury currency consisted of legal tender notes (greenbacks), gold and
silver coin, gold and silver certiﬁcates, and paper fractional currency.
National bank notes and Treasury-issued currency could be used for many of the
same purposes. However, there were two important distinctions. First, national
bank notes did not qualify as reserves for national banks. Second, national bank
notes could not be used to pay customs duties, which were a large fraction of federal
revenue during the period.
In this section, we examine the time-series and seasonal properties of national
bank note circulation. Figure 5 shows aggregate national bank notes outstanding,
in the U.S. Treasury, and in circulation. There are several things to note about the
Figure 5: National Bank Notes Outstanding, in the Treasury, and in Cir-














Sources: Andrew (1910) for data up through 1909. Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency
for 1910–1914.
data in this graph. Bank notes denoted as “in Treasury” are notes going through
12the formal redemption process. This amount represents the diﬀerence between notes
outstanding and in circulation. Idle notes in the vault of the issuing bank do not
appear in this graph, did not count as circulation, and were not subject to taxation.
Since the formal redemption process through the U.S. Treasury began in 1874, the
breakdown only begins in that year. There is no distinction between notes outstanding
and notes in circulation prior to 1874.
From Figure 5, we see that national banks quickly ramped up note issuance in
the years following passage of the National Bank Act. The pattern mimics the rapid
formation of national banks observed in Figure 1.
4.1 Limits on aggregate circulation
The original act restricted the aggregate amount of outstanding bank notes to $300
million. National banks approached this limit in late 1866. After much debate in
Congress, this limit was increased to $354 million in 1870. By late 1873, banks rapidly
were approaching this new limit on note issue. In 1875, the limit on aggregate notes
outstanding was repealed. After that time, circulation was only eﬀectively limited by
the amount of eligible collateral.
Despite the repeal of limits on aggregate notes outstanding, national bank note
circulation only brieﬂy exceeded $354 million in late 1874 and early 1875. During
the late 1870s, national bank note circulation rose at moderate rates. However,
beginning in 1882, aggregate circulation began to fall. Year over year, national bank
note circulation fell at a 6.5% annual rate from 1882 to 1892. Overall, national bank
note circulation fell by over 50% during this period. This is one component of the
“national bank note puzzle” I address in the working paper of that title.
After 1900, national bank note circulation surged. In fact, as noted previously,
by the end of the National Banking System era, national banks held over 80% of the
13eligible collateral and, correspondingly, were approaching the maximum amount of
circulation allowed under the National Banking Act.9
4.2 Seasonal pattern of national bank note circulation
After examining the time-series properties of national bank note circulation, we now
turn to a discussion of its seasonal behavior.
From Figure 5, it is clear that, even though we have monthly data, it displays
very little, if any, seasonal variability. The lack of seasonal ﬂuctuations in national
bank note circulation was a common contemporary criticism of the system.
Figure 6 illustrates the seasonal pattern in national bank note circulation.10 There
was a tendency for national bank note circulation to increase during the spring plant-
ing season and the fall harvesting season, when liquidity and credit demand were high
in the agricultural sector. However, note circulation varied less than two percentage
points over the months.
Furthermore, none of the monthly seasonal dummies are signiﬁcant at any reason-
able level of statistical signiﬁcance. National bank note circulation has been frequently
criticized, contemporaneously and more currently, for its observed inelasticity—its in-
ability to rise and fall in volume with the “needs of trade.” These criticisms appear
9This statement is not quite accurate due to the passage of the Aldrich-Vreeland Act in 1908.
This act allowed the issuance of “emergency circulation” backed by a broader range of securities than
merely U.S. government securities. This implies that when issuance of the emergency circulation
was allowed, the maximum amount of national bank note circulation could exceed that allowed by
U.S. government securities alone.
10Appendix B of the monograph describes the procedures used to extract seasonal information for
the variables examined in this paper. Basically, for monthly data like national bank note circulation,
the data are ﬁrst detrended using a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. A regression using standard ordinary
least squares with twelve monthly dummies is then calculated to obtain the monthly coeﬃcients.
For call report data which has irregularly spaced data, each series is logged and generalized least
squares is applied. The dependent variables are trend, trend-squared, and sine and cosine variables
at various seasonal frequencies. Monthly coeﬃcients are then generated from the sine and cosine
regression coeﬃcients. I thank John Geweke and Warren Weber for extensive discussions on this
estimation procedure.
14Figure 6: National Bank Note Circulation Seasonal Pattern 1874–1914
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Sources: Andrew (1910) for data up through 1909. Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency
for 1910–1914.
to be well founded.11 We examine the inelasticity of national bank note circulation
more thoroughly in Chapter 7.
There is one other interesting feature of the national bank note circulation data
presented in Figure 5. A casual look at the data demonstrates that beginning in 1908,
the data appear to display a greater degree of seasonal variability than prior to that
year. More formally, an F-test of the null hypothesis that all the monthly coeﬃcients
for national bank note circulation are equal to zero cannot be rejected prior to 1908.
However, the corresponding F-test for the data from 1908 to 1913, even with the
small number of observations, is signiﬁcant at the one percent level. This indicates
11Kemmerer (1910) documented the inelasticity of national bank note circulation at an early date.
He referred to the elasticity of national bank note circulation as being of the “bubble gum variety.”
15that indeed circulation does have a greater seasonal movement after 1908. To my
knowledge, this has not been pointed out before by previous authors.
5 Banking Variables
This section takes a look at some of the important elements of national bank balance
sheets. A national bank of this period performed many of the same operations of
a modern bank, with one important distinction. National banks could issue private
bank notes. After acquiring eligible U.S. government securities, a national bank would
deposit those securities with the U.S. Treasury and receive bank notes in return.
These notes could be used to make loans and purchase securities. As with modern
banks, national banks of this era acquired funds through deposits and injections of
bank capital. Borrowing provided only a very minor source of bank funds during this
period.
Table 4 details the most important components of a typical national bank bal-
ance sheet, along with the each components percentage share of total assets. The
Table 4: Prototypical National Bank Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilities
Reserves 9% Bank notes in circulation 7%
Loans 55% Individual deposits 51%
U.S. government securities 8% U.S. deposits 1%
Other securities 9%
Due from other banks Due to other banks
and reserve agents 13% and reserve agents 19%
Other assets 6% Capital 22%
percentage values represent the average for aggregate balance sheets over the entire
era. These percentages, of course, varied over time and particularly varied between
16country and city banks.
Most of the items in the prototypical balance sheet are self-explanatory. However,
some of the items deserve more discussion. On the asset side, other securities include
bank holdings of call loans and other forms of bonds, such as municipal bonds. The
“due from” and “due to” elements on the asset and liability sides of the balance sheet,
respectively, represent what are often call “banker’s balances.” Bankers’ balances
are partially the result of the structure of reserve holdings, which are explained in
the following section. They also illustrate the importance of correspondent bank
relationships that were formed during the period. These relationships became an
important component of the payments system during the national banking era and
are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
5.1 Reserves
Initially national banks were legally required to hold reserves against both their cir-
culation (bank notes) and deposits. The reserve requirement was the same for both
time and demand deposits. Reserves consisted of bank holdings of specie (gold and
silver coin), gold and silver certiﬁcates, legal tender notes (greenbacks), fractional
currency, and, beginning in 1874, lawful money in the ﬁve percent fund held by the
Treasury for the redemption of bank notes. Reserve requirements against circula-
tion were dropped with the establishment of the ﬁve percent redemption fund. On
average, bank reserves constituted nine percent of bank assets.
The system of reserve requirements under the National Banking System was rather
complex. Here I brieﬂy discuss the reserve requirement regime in eﬀect after reserve
requirements on circulation were eliminated.
175.1.1 Reserve requirements under the National Banking System
There were three tiers of banks relevant to the holding of reserves. Table 5 details
reserve requirements for these three tiers of banks.




Bank Location on Deposits Where Held
Central Reserve City 25% All in bank
Reserve City 25% 1/2 in bank, 1/2 in higher tier bank
Country 15% 2/5 in bank, 3/5 in higher tier bank
Source: Annual Report of Comptroller of the Currency (various years).
Banks in the top tier were called “central reserve city banks.” Initially, the only
central reserve city banks were those located in New York City. Chicago and St. Louis
became central reserve cities in 1887. Central reserve city banks had to hold 25% in-
bank reserves against deposits.
Banks in the middle tier were called “reserve city banks.” Eighteen reserve cities
were established by the original act. As cities increased in population, they became
eligible to become reserve cities. By the end of the era, there were a total of 47
reserve cities. Banks in reserve cities also had to hold 25% reserves against deposits.
However, one-half of those reserves could be held in a correspondent bank in a central
reserve city. The remainder had to be held in the bank own vaults.
Banks in the lowest tier were called “country banks.” These banks were those in
all remaining locations. Country banks were required to hold 15% reserves against
deposits. Three-ﬁfths of these reserves could be held with a correspondent bank in
18either a reserve city or a central reserve city.
This system of reserve requirements came under criticism during the period and
led to what was commonly called a “pyramiding of reserves.”12 Lower tier banks held a
portion of their reserves in a correspondent bank in a higher tier. Such correspondent
balances typically earned interest. Of course, a bank holding reserves in its own vault
earned no interest, so banks had the incentive to hold reserves with correspondent
banks. Besides paying interest, these “bankers’ balances” could be used to facilitate
transactions in large cities for the bank’s customers. The reserve structure meant
that a signiﬁcant fraction of reserves ended up in New York City, where they were
frequently invested in call loans.
Each summer and winter, reserves would ﬂow toward the large city banks. During
spring planting season and fall harvesting season, when liquidity demand was high
in the agricultural regions, reserves would ﬂow back to the interior as country banks
withdrew deposits from city banks. If there was some disruption to this process, such
as the failure of a large bank or trust company, these ﬂows could be interrupted,
resulting in a possible panic situation. Although Sprague (1910) originally presented
this view, it is clearly stated by Goodhart:
...ﬁnancial crises and season variations were not considered to be separate phenomena.
Financial crises were attributed, with a great deal of truth, not so much to cyclical
factors as to the natural results of the recurring autumnal pressures upon the money
market; these seasonal pressures were so extreme that it took only a little extra strain—
in the form of overheated boom conditions or the bursting bubbles of Wall Street
speculators—to turn tightness into distress. (Goodhart 1969, p. 3)
Champ, Smith, and Williamson (1996) refer to this view as the “seasonal plus
shock” explanation of banking crises during the period. During periods when the
system was typically under stress (spring and, especially the fall season), an additional
12O.M.W Sprague was one of the more vocal contemporary critics of the reserve system imposed
by the National Banking Acts. He strongly argued for revisions in the system in Sprague (1910).
19shock to the system could send it into panic. This view has received some criticism
over the years, and we discuss the issues related to it in more detail in the companion
paper titled “Banking Panics.”
Figure 7 shows total reserves held by national banks at call dates determined by
the Comptroller of the Currency, and Figure 8 illustrates movements in the reserve-
to-deposit ratio.
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Source: Call reports from the Annual Report of Comptroller of the Currency (various years).
Unfortunately, it is diﬃcult to determine the pattern of reserves during panic
periods from call report data. There were only ﬁve call reports required of national
banks each year. Furthermore, the Comptroller appears to have picked call dates that
avoided periods when the system was most under stress. However, we do observe a
signiﬁcant runup in reserves and in the reserve-deposit ratio after the panics of 1884,
1893, and 1907. (Friedman and Schwartz 1963) note that increases in the reserve-to-
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Source: Call reports from the Annual Report of Comptroller of the Currency (various years).
deposit ratio came signiﬁcantly (up to a year) after the panic periods and occurred
during contractionary periods of the business cycle. These strong upward movements
in the reserve-to-deposit ratio undoubtedly represented deliberate actions of banks to
increase liquidity in response to the preceding panics and also reﬂected public distrust
in the banking system. But details of reserve behavior during the panic periods are
impossible to ascertain from the call report data.
However, we can analyze behavior for a select group of banks by looking at clear-
inghouse bank data, which were reported monthly.13 As detailed in Champ, Smith,
and Williamson (1996), monthly data from clearinghouse banks in New York City
show a marked decline in reserves during panic periods. As they note, “reserves are
from 25% to 55% below trend during the three panics [of 1884, 1893, and 1907].”
13Clearinghouse bank data can be found in Andrew (1910).
21(Champ, Smith, and Williamson 1996, p. 849) Naturally, due to the structure of
holdings of reserves, we would expect the most extreme movements in reserves to
appear in the clearinghouse banks of New York.
5.1.2 Seasonal pattern of reserves
The seasonal pattern of reserve holdings is of particular interest and is illustrated in
Figure 9. National banks tended to ramp up reserves at the conclusion of the spring
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Source: Call reports from the Annual Report of Comptroller of the Currency (various years).
planting season and during the idle early months of the year. During those periods,
bank reserves were two to three percent above trend. Bank reserve holdings fell
markedly below trend during the fall harvest season. On average, reserve holdings
were three to four percent below trend during October and November. An F-test
22of the null hypothesis that all the seasonal coeﬃcients are equal to zero is strongly
rejected, indicative of the signiﬁcant seasonal movement in this variable.
For clearinghouse banks in New York, the movements in reserves was even stronger.
New York clearinghouse reserves typically fell by more than six percent during the
autumn harvesting season.
5.2 Deposits
As detailed in Table 4, individual deposits constituted a little over half of bank liabili-
ties and capital. The Comptroller’s call reports unfortunately do not break individual
deposits into greater detail. To a great extent this is due to the fact that there was
little diﬀerence in the regulations imposed on time versus demand deposits—the re-
serve requirement was the same for both types of deposits. Furthermore, both types
of deposits typically paid interest. We do know that in the early part of the period,
time deposits represented practically all of individual deposits. However, beginning
in the 1870s, checking accounts played an increasing role. Their role was primarily
limited to city banks, and demand deposits had very limited use outside the city of
issue due to the poor communications network of the era. Large interregional pay-
ments typically were made in the form of a certiﬁed check drawn on New York banks.
(See James and Weiman 2006.)
Certain banks were designated as U.S. government depositories. Banks holding
government deposits had to also hold U.S. government bonds as collateral for those
deposits. In the aggregate, these deposits only accounted for one percent of bank lia-
bilities and capital. However, for those banks designated as depositories, government
deposits were an important source of funds. Furthermore, these government deposits
were used in the early implementation of monetary policy by the U.S. Treasury during
the late 1800s.
23Figure 10 displays the call report data on individual deposits. The data indicate
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Source: Call reports from the Annual Report of Comptroller of the Currency (various years).
fairly steady growth in individual deposits in national banks throughout the entire
period. However, the panics of 1893 and 1907 can be clearly seen in the data. These
panic periods resulted in signiﬁcant declines in the level of deposits in national banks
as public distrust of banks caused deposit withdrawals.
In order to scale the magnitude of individual deposits in national banks, Figure 11
presents data on the ratio of individual deposits to total assets. As with the time-
series data on the level of deposits, we can clearly see the panic periods in these data.
We also note a signiﬁcant upward trend in the importance of individual deposits
in national bank balance sheets. From 1885 to 1914, the percentage of bank total
liabilities and net worth in the form of individual deposits rose by over ten percentage
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Source: Call reports from the Annual Report of Comptroller of the Currency (various years).
points.
5.2.1 Seasonal pattern of deposits
The seasonal pattern of individual deposits in national banks is portrayed in Figure 12.
The seasonal movement in deposits is not strong, varying only one percent or less from
trend. We see that deposits tended to be relatively high in the spring and late fall.
Despite their small magnitude, these seasonal coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 5%
level.
Data for clearinghouse banks in New York display much greater seasonal variation
than for the aggregate data. The basic pattern is also somewhat diﬀerent for the
clearinghouse banks. In those banks, deposits rise two percent above trend in the
summer and fall four percent below trend in the fall.
25Figure 12: National Bank Individual Deposits Seasonal Pattern, 1880–
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Source: Call reports from the Annual Report of Comptroller of the Currency (various years).
5.3 Bankers’ balances
Bankers’ balances refer to deposits of ﬁnancial institutions in correspondent banks.
For national banks, these consisted of balances due to other national banks, state
banks, mutual savings banks, and trust companies. Recall that the system of reserve
requirements allowed the holdings of a fraction of country and reserve city national
bank reserves in correspondent banks. Furthermore, some state banking laws allowed
state banks to hold a fraction of their reserves in national banks. These reserve
holdings represented one source of bankers’ balances. The other source was due to
the payments system. Bankers’ balances were often held to facilitate interregional
payments.
For these reasons, the majority of bankers’ balances were in city banks, with
26New York City banks holding a large portion of these balances. Figure 13 displays
call report data on bankers’ balances.14 The displayed data consist only of bankers’
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balances held at city banks. The data show a strong upward trend beginning around
1897. Many of the series (including deposits and loans) examined in this paper show
marked increases in trend beginning in 1897. Although it is diﬃcult to pinpoint the
timing of this break on any change in national banking laws, it is interesting to note
that this corresponds to when the long-standing debate over gold versus silver was
resolved by the defeat of William Jennings Bryan in the election of 1896.
To illustrate the increasing importance of bankers’ balances to the entire banking
system, Figure 14 plots bankers’ balances as a fraction of total national bank assets.
14In terms of the Comptroller of the Currency’s call report data, I deﬁne bankers’ balances to be
funds due to national banks, state banks, trust companies, and reserve agents.
27We see that bankers’ balances as a fraction of total assets rises from around 20% at
Figure 14: City Banks Due to Other Financial Institutions as a Fraction
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Source: Call reports from the Annual Report of Comptroller of the Currency (various years).
the end of 1800 to over 35% in the early 1900s. We can also easily see in Figure 14
the tendency of country banks to withdraw balances from city banks at dates around
panic periods.
5.3.1 Seasonal pattern of bankers’ balances
The seasonal pattern of bankers’ balance is indicative of the strong interregional ﬂow
of funds during the national banking era. Figure 15 illustrates the seasonal pattern of
bankers’ balances for city banks. As discussed previously, bankers’ balances tended to
rise in the idle months at the beginning of the year and during the summer months.
During the fall harvest season, country banks made signiﬁcant withdrawals of cash
28Figure 15: City Banks Due to Other Banks Seasonal Pattern 1880–1910
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Source: Call reports from the Annual Report of Comptroller of the Currency (various years).
from city banks, resulting in bankers’ balances falling 5% below trend. The seasonal
coeﬃcients are highly signiﬁcant.
5.4 Loans
As with modern banks, loans represented the most important source of revenue for
national banks. On average over the period, 55% of the total assets of national banks
consisted of loans. Unfortunately, the call report data does not break down the types
of loans held by national banks. Legal restrictions on branching greatly limited the
ability of banks, especially country banks, to diversify their loan portfolio. A drought
in an agricultural region could lead to severe ﬁnancial problems for country banks in
the region.
29Figure 16 presents aggregate bank loans and overdrafts at call report dates. As
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with many components of national bank balance sheets, loans contracted sharply at
call report dates following the panic periods of 1884, 1893, and 1907.
Expressing loans as a fraction of total bank assets reveals some interesting patterns
that are not obvious in the loan data in levels. This is shown in Figure 17. Except
for the call dates following panics, the loan-asset ratio rises sharply from 1880 to the
beginning of 1891. This is followed by an equally sharp downward trend until 1898.
The period from 1891 to 1897 is marked by two sharp contractions, so the decline in
loans is not surprising. From 1898 on, there is little trend in the loan-asset ratio.
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5.4.1 Seasonal pattern of loans
Total national bank loans shows little seasonal variation, varying less than one per-
cent from trend over the year. The seasonal pattern in bank loans is illustrated in
Figure 18. Furthermore, an F-test of the seasonal coeﬃcients show that they are only
signiﬁcant at the 6% signiﬁcance level.
As with many of the series, the movements in loans for New York City clearing-
house banks is stronger than for the aggregate data. Loans in the clearinghouse banks
fall over two percent below trend during the fall.
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6 Interest Rates
One of the most striking features of the period of the National Banking System is the
behavior of interest rates. Interest rate behavior during this period is both dramatic
and puzzling. On the surface, given the bank note-issuing regime of the period, it
appears that arbitrage conditions are broken.
Champ, Wallace, and Weber (1994) present a model of bank note issuance that
attempts to mimic that of the national banking system. Under the assumption that
national bank notes and other forms of money were perfect substitutes, the model
generates the result that safe short-term rates and the yield on eligible securities
should have been pegged at the tax rate on national bank notes (one percent before
321900 and, eﬀectively, one-half percent thereafter).
The argument goes something like this. National banks could essentially borrow
at the tax rate on note issue. With their notes, they should have been able to proﬁt
by purchasing securities (like government bonds) that possessed yields in excess of
that tax rate. Purchases of these securities should have continued until yields on
them approximated the tax rate on issue.
However, this prediction is strongly rejected by the data. Short-term interest
rates are considerably above the tax rate on note issue and the long-term yields on
eligible collateral are a percentage point or more above the tax rate. Of course, the
observed call loan rate is not a safe short-term rate in that call loans possess default
risk. However, it is diﬃcult to believe that the extreme variability in the call loan
rate can be completely explained by changes in default risk. In addition, the tax rate
on note issue eﬀectively declines from 1% to 1/2% in 1900. We would expect a similar
decline in the average level of call loan rates and government bond yields, but this is
not borne out in the data.
I examine the puzzle related to interest rate behavior during the national banking
era in great detail in a later chapter called “The National Bank Note Puzzle.” For
now, we simply discuss the observed patterns in the data.
6.1 Short-term rates
We have two sets of reliable data on short-term interest rates—data on call loan rates
and commercial paper rates. Unfortunately, data on other important interest rates,
like bank deposit rates, is scarce.
336.1.1 Call loan rates
Much emphasis has been placed in the literature regarding the behavior of call loan
rates during the national banking era. Monthly data on call loan rates in New York
City are shown in Figure 19. It is easy to see why the data have received so much
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attention. The call loan rate varies markedly over the year and, occasionally, peaks at
extremely high rates. Over the period 1865–1913, the average call loan rate was 4.5%.
But call loan rates in excess of 10% per annum were not unusual. During the panic of
1873, the call loan rate peaked at over 61%. It is important to note that the data on
call loan rates presented here are monthly averages. Daily data would indicate spikes
in excess of those shown in Figure 19. In general, panic periods witnessed particularly
strong upward movements in call loan rates.
34Call loans are of particular importance to a study of the national banking era.
Recall that due to the structure of reserves, idle funds tended to accumulate as reserves
in correspondent banks in New York. Often, these funds found their way into the call
loan market. Hence, call loans were particularly important to many of the largest
banks in New York.
6.1.2 Commercial paper rates
Figure 20 presents interest rates for prime 60–90-day double-name commercial paper.
We observe similar, although less dramatic, movements in commercial paper rates
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relative to those observed for call loans. Commercial paper rates rose to 16.5% in
October 1873, during the panic of that year. During the 1893 panic, commercial
paper rates approach 11%.
356.1.3 Seasonal pattern of short-term rates
Besides reaching high levels during panic periods, short-term interest rates display
signiﬁcant seasonal movements. Figures 21 and 22 show the monthly coeﬃcients for
call loan rates and commercial rates, respectively. The call loan rate has greater











Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan
Source: Macaulay (1938).
seasonal variability, rising roughly one to two percentage points above trend during
the last four months of the year. From May to August, it is roughly one to one and
a half percentage points below trend. The commercial paper rate shows a similar
seasonal pattern although it varies less than a percentage point over the seasons.
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6.1.4 Long-term rates on eligible securities
There were a number of classes of U.S. government securities eligible as backing for
national bank notes. In general, the eligible securities were long-term bonds with call
provisions. For example, the 4s of 1907 were a bond held as backing for national bank
notes. Bonds of this era were typically denoted by their annual coupon rate and a date
they became “redeemable” or callable. So, the 4s of 1907 were four percent annual
coupon rate bonds that became redeemable in 1907. They were originally issued in
1877 and, thus, were 30-year bonds. Often the bonds were called on the announced
call date, so that the call date was also the maturity date. This was the case with the
4s of 1907. However, some bond classes were not called at their “redeemable” date
and became callable “at the pleasure of the government”—in other words, callable at
37any time.
Figure 23 illustrates the yields on three bond classes held by national banks as
backing for bank notes. These bonds are the 4s of 1907, the 4s of 1925, and the 2s
Figure 23: Yields on Selected Eligible U.S. Government Securities, 1882–













Source: Commercial and Financial Chronicle (various years).
of 1930. The 2s of 1930, along with the 2s Panamas (issued to build the Panama
Canal), became popular bonds for banks to hold as backing due to their preferential
tax treatment. After March 1900, notes secured by 2% coupon rate bonds were
subject to an annual tax of one-half percent. Notes secured by bonds with higher
coupon rates were taxed at the old rate of one percent. By the end of 1913, these two
bond classes made up over 92% of bank holdings as backing for notes, and banks held
over 90% of the total amount of these bonds outstanding. For that reason, one could
argue that the collateral constraint was nearly binding at the end of the national
38banking era.
Recall that by the arguments put forth in Champ, Wallace, and Weber (1994),
the yield on eligible bonds should have been pegged at the tax rate on note issue (one
percent before 1900 and, eﬀectively, one-half percent thereafter. Yields on government
bonds were from 100 to 200 basis points above the tax rate, suggesting the possibility
of arbitrage proﬁts. This is another component of the national bank puzzle.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have taken an introductory look at some of the important data related
to the national banking era. A major emphasis has been to examine the behavior of
certain key variables, over time, during panic periods, and over the seasons. Some
of the important observations we have made and questions we have asked are the
following.
With regard to the establishment of national bank charters, the early years of the
era saw rapid growth. Many of these early charters were state banks that converted
to national banks. However, the initial conversion of state banks to national bank
status practically stopped by 1867. After that, most newly-chartered national banks
had not been in operation previously.
We have seen that national banks never fully intermediated the eligible government
securities in the form of national bank notes. For the period before 1900, national
banks held only 20–30% of the eligible bonds as backing for notes. After 1900, the
fraction held steadily increased. Only at the very end of the national banking era
were banks coming close to fully intermediating the stock of government bonds.
National bank note circulation, especially when viewed in the light of interest
rate behavior during the period, is particularly puzzling. There are three interesting
39puzzles related to national bank note circulation. First, with interest rates far in
excess of the tax rate on circulation, why didn’t banks choose to issue more bank
notes? It appears that an arbitrage condition is being broken. The generally low
issuance of national bank notes over the period is certainly a puzzle. Second, what
caused the large dip in circulation from 1882 to 1892? Third, we also noted that
national bank note circulation has very little, if any, seasonal variation, especially
before 1908. What caused the observed inelasticity over much of the period, and
what caused the apparent increase in elasticity toward the end of the era? All these
questions and puzzles are addressed in other working papers in this series.
This paper also introduced the potential complications created by the system
of reserve requirement during the period. The system encouraged the holding of
bank reserves outside a bank’s own vault but did not provide an eﬃcient means to
reallocate those reserves in time of ﬁnancial crisis. This, of course, was one of the
main criticisms of the period and a major reason for the establishment of the Federal
Reserve System. However, it is important to note that there were some beneﬁcial
results emanating from the reserve system structure. It encouraged the formation
of an intricate network of correspondent relationships. These relationships greatly
contributed to the formation of a national payments system.
Also of interest is the signiﬁcant increase in trend in deposits, bankers’ balances,
and loans beginning around 1897. The break in this trend is not easily traceable to
any changes in the statutes governing national bank operations. Could the end of the
debate regarding gold versus silver have reduced uncertainty for the players in the
ﬁnancial system suﬃciently enough to encourage the system to more rapidly expand?
For most of the variables in this paper, we discovered their key seasonal patterns.
Table 6 provides a useful summary of these seasonal patterns. With the exception of
national bank note circulation, these seasonal patterns are statistically signiﬁcant.
40Table 6: Summary of Seasonal Patterns in the Data
Variable Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Circulation – – + + – – – – + + + +
Reserves + + – + + + + + – – – –
Deposits – – – + + – + – – + + –
Due tos + + + + + – + + – – – –
Loans – – – + + + + + + + + –
Call rate + – – + – – – – + + + +
CP rate – – – – – – – – + + + +
In the table, a plus indicates above trend and a minus indicates below trend. “CP rate” denotes the
commercial paper rate, and “Due tos” denotes bankers’ balances held by city banks. The monthly
coeﬃcients for circulation were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
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